1.Introduction
OnAugust18, 2007, a front-page story inThe Wall StreetJournalhighlighted theideas of economist Hyman Minsky. With the U.S. economy in the midst of a worsening credit crunch, reporterJustinLahartobservedthatalthoughMinskydied in1996, hisviewswere 'reverberating from New York to Hong Kong as economists and traders are trying to understandwhat'shappeninginthemarkets'(Lahart2007) .
Since 2007, attention to Minsky' sideas has increased as global economic conditions have deteriorated(see,forexample,Cassidy2008;Pollin2008;and' Minsky'sMoment'2009) (Lahart 2007) . Ifthetroublewere to become so widespreadthatitthreatenedthebankingsystematthenationalorinternationallevel,then somewouldreplacetheword'moment'with'meltdown'(Magnus2008) .However,thefocus isstillonasingleincident,notontheevolutionarypathofeconomicactivity.
Others exposed to Minsky's AfullappreciationofMinsky'sinsights,however,mustrecognizethat aboutthelastdozen yearsofhislifeweredevotedlargelytosynthesizingthefinancial-instabilityhypothesisand anunderstanding of long-term capitalist development.Indeed, in an essaywritten forthe hundredth anniversary of the birth of John Maynard Keynes and Joseph Schumpeter, Minskywrote: 'The task confronting economics todaymay be characterized as a need to integrate Schumpeter's vision of a resilient intertemporal capitalist process with Keynes's hardinsightsinto thefragilityintroducedinto thecapitalist accumulation processbysome inescapable properties of capitalist financial structures' (Minsky 1986a, 121) . A key conclusion ofMinsky'spursuit ofsuchasynthesisisthat although the 'basicpath' ofrealworldcapitalism iscyclical (Minsky1975, 9) , the'money-managercapitalism' characteristic ofrecentdecadesdifferssubstantiallyfrom the 'managerialcapitalism'foundintheUnited StatesimmediatelyafterWorldWarII(Minsky1990a; 1993a 
2.CyclicalDynamics
Minsky's financial-instability hypothesis can be seen as an alternative to the 'efficientmarket hypothesis' of conventional economics. According to that conventional view, investors,lendersandotherfinancial-marketparticipantsarenot,asagroup,predisposedto overconfidence or other biases (Shefrin 2000, 4) . In contrast, the financial-instability hypothesistreatsoverconfidenceandpanicsasregularfeaturesoftheeconomiclandscape.
MinskytracesthisaspectofhisperspectivetoKeynes,especiallytothelatter's1937articlein
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 'The General Theory of Employment' (Minsky 1975, 64-67; Keynes 1937) . In that essay, Keynes describes his departure from the mainstream economicsofhistime, whichhecalled'classical economictheory, ' asthedeparturefroma focusonlong-periodequilibrium(Keynes1937,213-214) .Behindboththeclassicaltheoryof Keynes' s time and the efficient-market hypothesis of our own is an assumption that the future can be treated as a matter involving risk (reducible to the calculation of probabilities), not uncertainty. Keynes, however, dismisses this substitution of risk for uncertaintyinthecaseofmosteconomicanalyses:
The wholeobjectoftheaccumulationofwealth isto produceresults,orpotential results,at acomparativelydistant, andsometimes at an indefinitely distant, date.
Thusthe fact thatourknowledgeofthefuture isfluctuating,vague anduncertain renderswealthapeculiarlyunsuitablesubjectforthemethodsofclassicaleconomic theory.Thistheorymightworkverywell inaworldinwhicheconomicgoodswere necessarily consumed within a short interval of their being produced. But it requires,Isuggest,considerableamendmentifitistobeappliedtoaworldinwhich the accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is an important factor; andthegreatertheproportionatepart playedbysuchwealth-accumulation themoreessentialdoessuchamendmentbecome(Keynes1937,213).
According to Minsky, the financial structure of our economy becomes more and more fragile overa period of prosperity. In the early stages of prosperity, enterprises in highly profitablesegmentsoftheeconomyarerewardedfortakingonincreasingamountsofdebt.
Andtheirsuccessencouragesotherfirmstoengageinsimilarbehavior.
Thispatternwascertainly evidentinthehigh-techsectorduring thelate1990s andinthe housing sector during the early-and mid-2000s. In fact, construction companies and contractorswerenottheonlyonestakingonmoredebtinthe2000s.Homebuyerswerealso takingonmoredebt asthehousingmarketbeganheatingup,inpartbecauseinterestrates werelowandthestockmarkethadbecomelessattractiveinthewakeofthedot-comboom and bust. While it had long been customary for U.S. homebuyers to make a 20-percent downpaymentonahome,42percentoffirst-timehomepurchasersand13percentofbuyers whowerenotfirst-timepurchasersput no moneydowntoacquirehomesinthemid-2000s (Baker2009a;Max2005;Irwin2005). 1
In retrospect, it seems that enterprises and homebuyersshouldhaveresisted the impulse towardincreasingindebtedness,buttheincentivesatthetimewerejusttoogreat. AsGary Dymski andRobertPollinexplainina1992essay,nobodyinarobustsectoroftheeconomy wantstobeleftbehindduetounderinvestment:
EvenifmarketparticipantsdidhavefullknowledgeoftheMinskymodel,andwere awarethatfinancialcriseswilloccuratsomepoint,thatwouldstillnotenablethem to predict when the financial crisis will occur. In the meantime, aggressive firm managers and bank loan officers will be rewarded for pursuing profitable opportunities and gaining competitive advantages. Cautious managers, operating fromtheunderstandingthatboomconditionswillendatsomeuncertainpoint,will be penalized when their more aggressive competitors surpass their short-run performance(DymskiandPollin1992,45). 2 As the preceding quote indicates, lenders as well as borrowers fuel the tendency toward greater indebtedness in an expansion. The same climate of expectations that encourages borrowerstoacquiremoreriskyfinancialliabilitystructuresalsoeaseslenders' worriesthat new loans might go unpaid (Minsky 1975) . Moreover, it is not just that borrowing and lending expand in the boom. There is also financial innovation. In fact, in a 1992 essay, Minskywrotethatbankers andother financial intermediariesare 'merchants ofdebt, who strive to innovate with regard to both the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market '(Minsky1992a,6 
3.StructuralEvolution
In a pair of articles designed to integrate key contributions of Keynes and Schumpeter, Minsky mentions that Keynes and institutionalist Wesley C. Mitchell had a common perspective on business cycles (Minsky 1993a; 1990a) . Bringing Mitchell into the picture helpsunderscorethesort ofsynthesistowardwhichMinskywasaiming:Mitchell hadlong agowrittenthat'eachnewcyclepresentsidiosyncrasies.Businesshistoryrepeatsitself,but alwayswithadifference' (Mitchell 1941,ix) .Inthe1990s,MinskystillbelievedthattheU.S. economy moves along a cyclical path, but he also believed that the system had recently The global natureof thecurrent situationwould not havesurprisedMinsky, who stressed earlyonthatmoney-managercapitalism'isinternationalinboththefundsandtheassetsin funds ' (Minsky1990a, 71) . Lookingaheadto thecurrent crisis,Minskywrote:'Theproblem of finance that will emerge is whether the … institutions of national governments can contain both the consequences of global financial fragility and an international debt deflation ' (Minsky1995,93) .HeworriedthattheUnitedStateswouldbeunableto serveas 'the guardian angel for stability in the world economy' and stressed the need for 'an international division of responsibility for maintaining global aggregate gross profits '(Minsky1986b,15; 1990a,71) . 
4.PublicPolicy
The current global economic situation requires a two-pronged economic-policy strategy: recovery and reform. Beyond stabilizing the troubled financial sector and preventing the current downturnfrom becomingmore severe, theoverarching policy objectiveshouldbe greater macroeconomic stability and broadly shared prosperity in the United States and abroad(Minsky1986c; MinskyandWhalen 1996 MinskyandWhalen -1997 
4.1Recovery
A government strategy for recovery must have at least three components: fiscal policy, monetarypolicy,andfinancial-marketpolicy.Eachisconsideredinturn.
ThefoundationofMinsky'sstrategyforavoidinganotherGreat Depressioniswhathecalls
'Big Government' (Minsky 1986c, 292-308) . At the heart of Big Government is a federal budget that tendstoward surplusesin inflationaryperiodsand that produces deficitslarge enough to stabilize aggregate profits in recessionary periods. Minsky stressed that such countercyclical spendingshould be a 'built-in' featureof the budget structure,buthealso recognizedthatdiscretionaryactionwouldbeneededonoccasion(Minsky1986c,132,292). Another aspect of financial-market policy that currently needs attention involves home mortgages.Throughout2008,theUnitedStateslargelyavoidedaddressingtheunaffordable mortgages that are at the heart of the current problem (Marks 2008 
4.2Reform
Lookingbeyondthecurrentdownturn,areformagendamustincludestricterregulationand supervision of the financial system, a national commitment to the challenges facing America's working families, and U.S. participation in efforts that promote international economicstabilityandjobcreation.
Minskybelieved that those responsible for government regulation and supervision of the financialsystemwereina'never-endingstruggle'withfinancialmarkets (Minsky,quotedin Phillips1997,512) .AshewroteinStabilizinganUnstableEconomy,'Afteraninitialinterval, thebasicdisequilibratingtendenciesofcapitalistfinancewill onceagainpushthefinancial structureto thebrinkoffragility. ' Still,hebelieveditwasnecessaryfortheFederal Reserve andregulatorstocontinuethestruggle:'Theevolutionoffinancialpracticesmustbeguided to reduce the likelihood that fragile situations conducive to financial instability will develop '(Minsky1986c,322,333) .
Today, those adopting a Minsky perspective would hold the same view. Greaterindustry transparency,morerigorousbankexaminations,andbroaderregulatoryoversightwouldbe a good place to start. If policymakers had better information about the extent to which financial institutions were making use of option ARMs and other exotic instruments, perhaps at least a few would have more aggressively sought to address the mounting problem. It also seems appropriate to revive Minsky's notion of a cash-flow approach to bank examinations,which'wouldusetheexaminationprocess to generate informationon not onlytheliquidityand solvencyof particularinstitutions, butalso on threats,ifany,to thestabilityoffinancial markets' (Minsky, quotedinPhillips1997,513) . Similarly,mortgage brokers, hedgefunds,andotherinstitutionsthat havegainedincreasingimportanceinthe past decade deserve greater scrutiny from financial-system regulators. 11 In light of the current economic crisis, stricter oversight of securitization and other recent financial innovations are clearly overdue, but the additional need is for regulators to be on the lookoutforfutureinnovationsinanefforttohead-offpotentialcrisesbeforetheyoccur. Employers have moved increasingly toward treating labor as just another 'spot market' commodity (Minsky 1996; Minsky and Whalen 1996-1997; Whalen 1997; Whalen 2008b Zalewski2002).
Thus, the economic challenges facing the United Statesextendfarbeyondstabilizing the financial systemandpreventing alonganddeeprecession,asMinskyandIdiscussedinan articlewrittenshortlybeforehisdeath(MinskyandWhalen1996-1997).Thenationneedsto spur the growth of domestic jobs that pay family-supporting wages and to ensure that Americans have access to the education and training such jobs require (Marshall 2010; GloverandKing2010) .Itneedstofindawaytopromotepartnershipsbetweenworkersand managers, so companies can compete on the basis of innovation, quality, and customer service,ratherthanbyoutsourcingjobsorslashingwagesandbenefits. It needstoprovide adjustmentassistancetoworkersdisplacedbyinternationaltrade(includingserviceworkers excluded from some existing benefits programs) and public-service employment to those unable to find private-sector work. And it needs health-care reform, retirement-system reform,andlabor-lawreform to address medical insecurity, retirement insecurity,andthe insecurityof workers who seek to exercise theirlegal right to engagein unionorganizing andcollectivebargaining(Whalen2008b;2008c).
To addressthechallengesfacingAmerica'sworkingfamilies,theObamaadministrationhas createdaMiddleClassTask Force,headedbyVicePresidentJoeBiden.Itsgoalssuggestan awarenessoftheissuesjustmentioned ('AbouttheTaskForce'2009 Minsky1995; 1993a; 1990b; 1986b; Palley 1999,55) . Stiglitz concluded, 'They had a strategy for job destruction. They hadno strategy for job creation' (Stiglitz, quotedinKomisar2000) . Economistswho seetheworldfrom a Minsky perspectiveneedtocollaboratetodevelopthatmissingstrategy.
5.Conclusion:StandingontheShouldersofMinsky
Minskyusedto say we should stand on the shoulders of giants to better understand the economy.JustashestoodontheshouldersofKeynesandSchumpeter,wecannowstandon his shoulders to understand and address the current global recession. From a Minsky perspective, an explanation of this recession must include cyclical and structural dimensions,whileapolicystrategyrequiresattentiontobothrecoveryandreform.
The recent attention to Minsky's ideas, both outside and within the academy, is encouraging.Yetwedo ourselvesandhis memoryadisservicewhen Minsky's Moreover, during the slump, all aggressive managers will fail together, so no single individual will be singled out for blame. This is in contrast to the boom, where the miscalculatingcautiouswillhavebeenisolated '(DymskiandPollin1992,45) . 12.Thereluctanceofgloballeaderstocooperateforthepurposeofestablishingafoundation forgreaterstabilityandmorewidespread global economicwellbeing canbeseeneven the currenteconomicclimate;seeZalewskiandWhalen (2009, (17) (18) .
